When the Supreme Court indulges Congress's indulgence in fuzziness.

SCOTUSblog says the Scalia dissent in Sykes v. United States is "awesome." Justice Scalia writes:

We face a Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of laws in general, and of criminal laws in particular. It should be no surprise that as the volume increases, so do the number of imprecise laws. And no surprise that our indulgence of imprecisions that violate the Constitution encourages imprecisions that violate the Constitution. Fuzzy, leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation is attractive to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a national problem but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nittygritty. In the field of criminal law, at least, it is time to call a halt. I do not think it would be a radical step—indeed, I think it would be highly responsible—to limit ACCA to the named violent crimes. Congress can quickly add what it wishes. Because the majority prefers to let vagueness reign, I respectfully dissent.

I remember the time a colleague of mine yelled at me for saying exactly that. She was working on a complicated project dealing with how courts should sort out the details in for Congresses that indulge themselves with fuzziness.

If the government gives tax credits for donations that may go to religion, is that essentially the same as government spending on religion?

Lyle Denniston reports on the oral argument today in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. This is a case about tax credits for contributions made to private tuition funds that make grants to students who go to private schools. Many of those schools are religious and some of the qualified funds only make grants to students who go to religious religious schools. Denniston begins his description with a claim that he detected Elena Kagan's purchase on the mind of Tony Kennedy (a subject we were just talking about the other day). Denniston says Kagan and Kennedy — the 2 Ks (sounds like trouble!) — "took crucial, reinforcing roles." I don't see much support for that point.

This case has a substantive Establishment Clause issue — whether government is subsidizing religion — and a threshold issue about standing — whether taxpayers can sue over this. These issues are linked because they both may depend on whether a tax credit turns the privately donated money into money from the state.

The lawyer defending the Arizona program said it was like tax deductions. People take tax deductions for their contributions to religious organizations all the time. What's different about tax credits? The lawyer arguing against the program "said that the money that is involved in the Arizona program is money raised by a tax; without a tax, there would be no tax credit."

If we view the tax credit as coming from the state's money, amassed by taxing, then the taxpayers who brought the suit probably have standing. But does that also answer the Establishment Clause question? Private citizens decide whether to contribute to a fund and pick from the qualified funds, not all of which exclusively fund religious schools, and the children getting the grants are choosing which school they want to go to. So there are 2 levels of private choice. And the definition of the funds is neutral and not religion-based.

Here's the complete transcript of today's argument.

UPDATE, April 4, 2011: The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lack standing. 

Margie Phelps, a daughter of Fred Phelps, will be arguing before the Supreme Court today.

The issue is freedom of speech, and the speech in question is repulsive. (Phelps's church protests near military funerals, with signs like "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," to express the view that God is punishing the U.S. for its immorality.) The father of one soldier sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress — which is a tort — and won $5 million against the church.

Much more detail at SCOTUSblog.  This is telling:

[T]his case has about it the promise of rewriting a considerable body of First Amendment law.

For a Court that so recently had refused to create a new exception to the First Amendment’s protection (so as to permit the outlawing of animal cruelty videos and films), the task of crafting a “funeral rights” exception to free speech doctrine may be a forbidding one. But for a Court hearing this case in the midst of war weariness and an expanding fear of decaying morality, the prospect of drawing a First Amendment shield around the Westboro Baptists’ message may also be a daunting one.

Perhaps this is a case in which the quality of legal advocacy, during oral argument, could make a difference. If one side or the other’s lawyer were to falter, for lack of seasoning at that demanding podium, it might ease the Justices’ decisional choice — but, then again, maybe not.

The quality of legal advocacy... is that meant as a laugh line? How did it happen that the work of upholding First Amendment rights is in the hands of Margie Phelps? I don't know the story, but it's not that the usual free speech defenders have failed to support these profoundly unpopular and ugly speakers. There are amicus briefs from the ACLU and from law professors in support of the Phelps group.

It will be interesting to see how Margie Phelps carries out her lawyerly task. Back in 2004, Michael Newdow argued his own case in the "Under God"/Pledge of Allegiance case and his nontraditional, passionate style seemed to work rather well.

Dr. Newdow, a nonpracticing lawyer who makes his living as an emergency room doctor, may not win his case.... But no one who managed to get a seat in the courtroom is likely ever to forget his spell-binding performance.

That includes the justices, whom Dr. Newdow engaged in repartee that, while never disrespectful, bore a closer resemblance to dinner-table one-upmanship than to formal courtroom discourse. For example, when Dr. Newdow described ''under God'' as a divisive addition to the pledge, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist asked him what the vote in Congress had been 50 years ago when the phrase was inserted.
The vote was unanimous, Dr. Newdow said.

''Well, that doesn't sound divisive,'' the chief justice observed.

Dr. Newdow shot back, ''That's only because no atheist can get elected to public office.''

The courtroom audience broke into applause, an exceedingly rare event that left the chief justice temporarily nonplussed. He appeared to collect himself for a moment, and then sternly warned the audience that the courtroom would be cleared ''if there's any more clapping.''

I doubt if there will be any clapping for Margie Phelps. Or any dinner-table-style repartee. She's coming in from the other end of the God spectrum, and we shall see how that sounds.